I'm an Associate Professor at Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. I also hold secondary appointments in the Department of Economics and the Global Health Institute.
As an applied microeconomist working in health policy / global health, my research focuses on topics including: performance based contracts, measurement of provider quality and performance, social franchising, and social accountability / monitoring. I also study the role of subjective expectations / beliefs in healthcare behavior.
Several of these projects feature field experiments and policy interventions / evaluations. I am currently working on research projects in India, Kenya, and China.
For more on policy evaluation and research
projects in India, please visit
Research highlights ....
Effect of Social Franchising and Telemedicine (Health Affairs, October 2016 and Bulletin of World Health Organization, May 2017)
Our research project evaluates a large scale social franchising program that aimed to improve care for childhood diarrhea and pneumonia. The WHP-Sky program, which won many global awards for social entrepreneurship and several million dollars in funding support, did not improve outcomes or quality of care.
Impact of the Chiranjeevi program (public private partnership for child birth) in Gujarat, India (Bull. WHO 2014) continues to inform policy debates:
Millions Saved (2016) by Glassman & Temin @ CGD covers our findings in depth.
"In Gujarat in western India, for example, a program to pay private doctors to offer hospital child-births to poor women failed to increase the number of hospital deliveries or reduce birth-related complications –because it never reached the poorest mothers. What this case showed is that good intentions need effective, targeted delivery systems to make a real difference. There is as much to learn from a health program that did not reach its goals as from one that did."
- Bill Gates (in his foreword to Millions Saved), May 2016.
New Paper on Accountability Interventions. ERID WP 295
Using a village level randomized trial design, we investigate two key mechanisms through which accountability interventions are hypothesized to improve healthcare delivery and health outcomes: information provision about health service entitlements and facilitation of collective action for community monitoring. We find large improvements in immunization rates, treatment of childhood diarrhea, and institutional delivery rates, modest improvements in child nutritional outcomes, and no effects on child mortality. Overall, the effects of information combined with facilitation are larger and statistically significant more often than that of providing information alone.
Working Paper on Input and Output Contracts in Health. NBER WP # 25499
One of the first papers to dig deeper into performance incentives to study how the structure of contracts (whether agents are paid on inputs or outputs). We find significant effects of both, but higher human capital providers, as theory predicts, perform better with output contracts that provide opportunities to innovate.
The "know-do" gap in quality JAMA Pediatrics (2015)
One of the first papers to document the gap between what healthcare providers know and the care they provide to patients.